Miliband of Brothers

The mood at the Labour Party Conference is said to be like a wake, with 49.35% of the delegates distraught and a chunk of the other 50.65% concerned that they may have elected the wrong brother. In contrast, today started off as a kind of retirement party, with most feeling that they were too cool to be there, but still prepared to listen kind-heartedly to elder statesmen Jack Straw and Alan Johnson (the latter showing what an eloquent, if unspectacular leader he might have been) before the new leader addressed the class of 2010.

The speech itself compensated for at least some of the speculation and criticism that has diminished the result but there is still an element of shock about Ed Miliband’s victory derived from the momentum of his campaign and the unpreparedness of David Miliband for defeat.

The Machinist

What Ed’s victory does show, for those who care to look, is an ability to position himself politically and the means to employ a formidable machine behind him. Ed learnt on the campaign trail – it seems to have been some time since his declaration speech in which civic empowerment, regulation of the banks and immigration featured strongly. Those themes recurred, up to and including his first leader’s speech, but the more important ones were criticism of the Iraq War, coming out for a living wage and the vehemence of his attack on ‘US-style capitalism’.

There was always an element of ‘stop David’ to Ed’s campaign – not that he necessarily instigated that mood, but he was ruthless enough to capitalise on it. David was discredited by being tied to the War on Terror after he refused to turn his back on the last government’s foreign policy, particularly the Iraq War. Ed sought desparately to nullify Ed Balls and Diane Abbot by stealing their natural constituency in the Trade Unions and did so. He then tacked rightwards in order to convince wavering party members and MPs that he was a credible, centrist candidate for the leadership. Ultimately, there are good reasons for arguing that six MPs swung it.

David, on the other hand, was content to eschew the machine politics that are intrinsic to a party as bureaucratic as Labour and always appeared to be concentrating on the next battle. Set-pieces such as the Keir Hardie lecture or the King Solomon speech (oh, yes) were on a different level to any other in the entire race, but focussed too intently on the next General Election and not on the leadership one. For someone who raised so much money, David seemed determined not to spend it.

What is interesting in these circumstances then, is not so much that Ed won the leadership, but that doing so brought him dangerously close to ruin in his first day as leader. Admittedly, the press resented the defeat of their choice (and The Sun and The Times feature prominently in their caricature of ‘Red Ed’), but a General Election can never be won by moving from the left to the centre ground. If the candidate is not discredited immediately, he appears opportunistic. Moving left from the centre ground is a slightly different matter, as David Miliband’s public profile has suggested. This dangerous label, the uninspiring victory speech and the ghost of his brother put Ed Miliband on the defensive and if he deflected some criticism on the Andrew Marr show, he still had a lot to do today.

The New Labour Playbook and Ed

It was therefore reassuring that Ed’s speech was politically and emotionally sophisticated, (even if it had to be squeezed into the Obama formula of life story, narrative, pragmatism, unity). He has been criticised for ditching the ‘New Labour Playbook,’ but in reality it was always going to be impossible to triangulate when your party is the sole alternative to a coalition that is broadly based.

David Cameron was the first to see that the latest divisions in politics were not between parties but within them and by supporting Blair’s education reforms in 2006 he drove the wedge deeper between Old and New Labour. Ed Miliband appeared to understand this, heaping praise on the old New Labour (contradiction?) positions on law and order and Alistair Darling’s reaction to the financial crisis.

On the one hand, Ed Miliband will find it easy to triangulate on the deficit reduction plan.  But on the other, he had to hug the coalition tight on civil liberties, law and order and welfare reform in order to convince the public that Labour are still the party of ‘hard-fought British liberties’. He did so successfully, for the most part, while also finding space to attack the government for offering defendants in rape trials anonymity and their peculiar attitude to CCTV (which, crucially, also showed that he could tell a joke as well as his brother).

There were also some bold strides either ahead of, or to the left of the coalition, depending on your view. The much-vaunted ‘living wage’ formed a centrepiece, and the EU Agency Directive and ‘good society’ also got mentions. The ‘good society’ may sound like a neat counterpart to David Cameron’s big society, but with Ed as with every other activist who likes that term, I wonder if they know what they mean by it, and worry that they do.

One thing that Ed Miliband is very keen on is equality (The Spirit Level is appearently outselling even Ralph Miliband tomes at Conference – no word on A Journey). In this, he ought to be careful. As Tony Blair puts it, Labour needs to ‘get’ (another Ed-ism) aspiration. Ed’s associates, notably Neil Kinnock and Roy Hattersley, see left of centre-majorities as low-hanging fruit and both the impending fiscal tightening and the referendum on Alternative Vote (which won Ed the leadership) will encourage this tendency. On the contrary, Labour will have to fight hard for its reputation and landing blows on the government is only half the battle. The Party is unlikely to have an easy road back to power and will have to challenge itself before the public finds it fit for purpose.

Ed’s Long Shadow

All of which brings us to the Shadow Cabinet. There are two scenarios which will hugely influence Ed’s freedom to choose his team, and David is not the major player. Instead, the key will be the performance of Ed Balls and whether he floats or flops. Balls got approximately eighty first or second preference votes from MPs, suggesting that he will top the poll (unless David stands). If there are any notable shifts in voting in Balls favour, this will strengthen his claim to have an anti-cuts majority in the party and therefore close in on the Shadow Chancellor’s position.

It is in Miliband’s interests to have Balls onside, but Yvette Cooper has an eye for detail that would make her a surer touch in a very unstable playing field. Miliband has also suggested that he would prefer an emollient Home Affairs spokesperson who ‘gets’ civil liberties. Balls is soundest when on the attack, and Health would therefore be a very suitable post for his talents, given that it is an area in which the government is divided (the Lansbury reforms). Getting him to take a portfolio other than the Shadow Chancellor will be the first challenge for Ed Miliband. The second will be stomaching a handful of Blairite ministers, preferably at Education and Welfare and Pensions.

Uncertainty – the Line Between Aggression and Defence

It really is amazing how little is known specifically about the ‘flotilla’ and Israel’s purpose in intercepting it. It may well be a question of the prevention of terror, and it looks like provocation at best, but the chickens of Israel’s lack of proportion and indifference to international opinion in recent years are coming home to roost.

Such have been the actions of Israel’s current government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu and its previous one, led by Ehud Olmert, that Israel’s ability to credibly portray this exercise as an act of self-defence has been severely hampered.

A Steady Slide of Responsibility

Although Israel has never peacefully enjoyed the fruits of its existence, its history since 2006 has been worrying. On January 4 of that year, Ariel Sharon had a massive stroke and lapsed into the coma that he is still in to this day. Sharon had never been regarded as a liberal, but he was a canny operator who knew how to play up Israel’s vulnerabilities – often by provoking its enemies. His policy of Unilateral Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip may not have won him any new supporters, for his motives were certainly open to question, but he effectively carved out a central position in Israeli politics and left none other than Netanyahu high and dry.

Sharon’s stroke, coupled with the election of Hamas in Gaza, had the effect of enfeebling his policy. His successor, Ehud Olmert, overreacted to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah and trampled over Lebanon, perhaps its most sympathetic neighbour. The war indicated the beginning of a period in which Israel would be easily provoked and led into situations where it could be accused of disproportionate aggression It also began the separation Israel from its allies – finishing off Tony Blair’s premiership.

The Lebanon War was followed by an attack on Hamas in Gaza in 2008. Gaza was a repeat of Lebanon in terms of public reactions, though its justifications were sounder. Rocket and mortar attacks on Israel had increased by 240% on 2007 levels, but the legacy of the war in the minds of most has been the Goldstone Report, which accused both sides of war crimes, a situation which Hamas could better endure than Israel.

Olmert was forced to resign over a corruption scandal in 2009, leading to elections in which Netanyahu has been able to form a coalition. Netanyahu, a noted hawk, has made it his mission to divide the relatively sceptical President Obama from the more unquestioning pro-Israel grouping in Congress by announcing further settlement expansions, although domestic political considerations also play their part.

A Misjudged Act of Defence

The circumstances around the loss of life in the boarding of the six ships sailing from Turkey to Gaza are very murky, which is why an inquiry is right. However, the success of that inquiry will depend on how much assistance the Israelis give, and how willing they are to divulge their intelligence, which seem unlikely.

Israel says that it had been in contact with the ships for days previously and warned them to divert but in the event that they did not do so, surrounded and boarded the ships. If Israel had tried to minimise fatalities – there is some contradiction between ‘shoot to kill’ and reports of rubber bullets and stun guns – it did not try hard enough. What’s more, it appears that the flotilla was not necessarily the bunch of terrorist sympathisers that Israel had anticipated – hence their enthusiasm to deport the detainees.

Another part of the controversy is that Israel acted in international waters, and its blockade of Gaza has drawn criticism from Nick Clegg and David Miliband today. The UN has previously criticised Israel for allowing less than a quarter of the recommended humanitarian aid into Gaza, and indeed, this list of proscribed items seems draconian.

An Unhappy and Uneasy Settlement

The fact remains, however, that policing shipments of aid into Gaza is a sensitive subject. Unwilling to trust any other supervisor, Israel issues its own warrants and carries out its own searches. That said, the limits of its allies have been comprehensively illustrated by this incident. Relations with Turkey, one of Israel’s most significant Muslim allies have been deteriorating for some time now, and the Turkish government’s uncompromising response to the nine deaths gives the impression of a trap that Israel has walked into. The UN, meanwhile, has diluted criticism of Israel, but the Security Council responds only to crises and with a kind of creative tension that still leads to calls such as this; to release all ships.

Israel is now caught in an awkward situation. If it intends to bluff out this latest blow to its image, it may well find itself even more isolated. That is not a consideration that will sway Netanyahu, but were more protestors to attempt a second flotilla he will have to decide whether to risk more violence and more outrage, and possibly another war, or a loosening of the blockade. Netanyahu is an instinctive conservative, who resisted Sharon’s great gamble in 2005. There is no sign yet that Israel will not be able to endure, even if the situation worsens, but a revanchist attitude will deepen the injustice that it is currently perpetrating.

Man on Wire

David Miliband has had a mixed few years, and specifically, a mixed few weeks.  A few weeks ago he made a speech to the Labour conference (the graveyard slot) that most media described as unhinged, and that I heard one Labour member describe as brilliant.  This week he could be lauded as Europe’s saviour, or he could reverse the West’s recently improving but schizophrenic relationship with Russia.

Of all the decisions Gordon Brown has made in his short premiership, two stand out as almost uniquely successful.  Bringing Mandelson back into the Cabinet was one.  Elevating David Miliband to the foreign office was another. 

Miliband was the strongest candidate when Brown faced the prospect of a stalking horse after Blair’s departure.  When Brown’s premiership was on the rocks, it was to Miliband that first plotters, and then James Purnell turned to, as the last great hope.  Miliband betrayed both (persuaded by Mandelson to remain in the Cabinet), and as a result saved the government and condemned himself to be passed over for the Labour leadership.

But Miliband’s inertia within the Labour Party are only a part of the story of his decline.  As significant has been his confinement in the foreign office.  It is a position – perhaps the only one – that does not offer a weapon with which to consolidate support to use against Brown.  Instead, it offers one of the most difficult conundrums in British policy – one that can’t be solved by money, that offers no easy choices and no photo ops; how does Britain deal with Russia?

Miliband is an intellectual, not a conviction politician, which shows itself more in his Russian policy than in anything else.  This week, when Miliband should be making his pitch to be the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs (the best way to restore his credibility in the Labour Party and ride out possible opposition), he has to walk the high-rope that is a diplomatic visit to Moscow.

Going, Miliband was optimistic.  On his Foreign Office blog he wrote,

“We don’t always see eye to eye with Russia, but we share the same global challenges and it is important that we work on them together.  And as we are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and members of the G8 and G20, there is a wide range of questions where, by working together, we really can make a difference.”

The implication is that Britain is giving up the passive resistance that has been the hallmark of Anglo-Russian relations.  Over the past three years, the Litvenenko affair, the British Council controversy and the Georgian war have been unprofitable.  It quickly became clear that Russia would not compromise, and that Europe did not have the unanimity to respond.

In recent weeks, Russian has shown some receptiveness to the American State Department’s re-setting initiative.  In return for the USA withdrawing its missile defence system, Russia made a vague statement on imposing sanctions on Iran.

I can only assume that Miliband’s visit is part of these developments.  However, it has hardly gone to plan.  The Litvenenko affair has been allowed to resurface, putting Miliband in an impossible bind. 

To be contrary, and go against the mood (very current, unsecure, but potentially powerful), or stand up for individual cases and abstract principles?  Either way, the issues are unavoidable.  Extending NATO or the EU to Russia’s borders could raise the chances of war (probably with Ukraine).  Too much emphasis on business means sacrificing the Russian civil society Miliband said he was keen to hear from to the dictates of the Kremlin.

Wittingly or not, Miliband’s visit has raised two uncomfortable debates at a time when they could least be afforded.  On the one hand, Labour faces a choice between a realist (dealing with the Russian government as is) or ethical (actively seeking to influence the internal balance) foreign policy.  Secondly, he raises the question of Europe’s approach.  Are European interests best served by trying to close the door on Russia, or by engaging with her?

The latter is the most immediate concern (the former is age-old, and still unresolved).  The Lisbon Treaty was designed to streamline European decision-making and maximise Europe’s collective influence.  The argument that Miliband seems likely to provoke could yet be good for Europe, but it is more likely to create divisions than to resolve them.  Britain will be seen as an awkward partner, or European countries simply will not be able to agree.

As for Miliband’s EU prospects?  They will not be helped, although Russia is not the most significant issue at stake.  Whether a diplomat can be an intellectual and still be effective is a serious question that was raised by Bill Clinton’s presidency.  Miliband may answer it.

The Blair Ultimatum

All the words needlessly spilt over this week’s controversy have turned up very few interesting arguments – either for or against – the prospect of Tony Blair becoming the first EU president.  In fact, most have been very bad, and the obsession with a British perspective has only obstructed intelligent debate.  It doesn’t much matter that Blair is from Britain, even though we are at times out of step with some European initiatives, and even though the next British government may be even more Eurosceptic.  Neither should politics be so important.  I’ve heard it said that pressure for a centre-right candidate is behind Merkel’s reluctance.  But what is Blair, if not a Christian democrat? Frankly, both his ideology and his contacts are secondary to his profile and his abilities.

There are two things working against Blair.   One is an almost visceral dislike of him, more as a person than as a professional.  Take this ridiculous article from Jeff Randall;

‘Mr Blair is a fake, a charlatan, a shameless twister. He is not “a pretty straight sort of guy”. Who else would play down his faith lest it be seen as a vote-loser?’

Most accuse Blair of free-loading, or jumping on the EU gravy train, as Randall puts it.  This argument is patently absurd.  If Blair were to take a role in the EU he would inevitably sacrifice a far more significant portion of his current income than he could possibly gain directly from the job, as perhaps the one decent article on the subject has made clear.  For a start, there’s the £2m annual salary from JP Morgan.  Then there’s the speaking engagements and consultancies.  Money has nothing to do with it.

Personal attacks are not rare in politics, but the only worthwhile ones concentrate on a candidate’s suitability for the role.  No one opposed to a Blair presidency has yet faced up to the question of how effective he would actually be.  Some views, admittedly, are based on his actions in office, but almost exclusively examples have little or no relation to the job that he would actually be doing.

This leads me nicely to the second argument against Blair, that he would be divisive.  It is ridiculous that Iraq is still so contentious, especially amongst European socialists, six and a half years after the event.  Blair’s pro-European endeavours – common defence, the social chapter, pro-active engagement – have all been forgotten.  And in a sense, joint military engagement has now been so decisively removed from the agenda that it should be easier to ignore the elephant in the room than it actually appears.

Blair is a natural diplomat.  His engagement with the gritty details in Palestine will only have added to his natural charm.  He managed the transition in British diplomacy from Clinton to Bush effortlessly, so the argument that his appointment might send a hostile signal to Obama is nonsensical.

The trouble is that Iraq exposed how disunited Europe really was, and the concern is that too vigorous a president might do so again.  The question then, is really about the kind of president Europe wants.  There has been some discussion about the two possible ways this could turn out. 

The bureaucrat would chair summits and make sure that the EU was well-administered.  There is no denying that Blair would be unsuitable for this role, and yet the right-wing critics, who seem the most vociferous in this country at least, would be ill-served by this model.  It would almost certainly mean more European government, and the status-quo, including the Common Agricultural Policy.

Blair is suited to the second model.  The virtue of his candidacy is that he could be a diplomat, without being diplomatic.  He would effectively represent the EU outside of its borders, but would also offer initiative.  Critics of his government have often said that there were too many initiatives, but it is a style that would suit the needs of the EU, where balancing interests is a pre-eminent concern.  Inevitably, it would involve banging heads together, but Blair has the right instincts on climate change, aid, and dare I say it, the Middle East to make Europe a big player.

Very few people inside the EU have yet gone on the record about Blair’s chances.  The latest is that Sarkozy and Merkel, who were very keen, are now holding back their support.  Momentum is important in decisions like these, but there is no explicit campaign, so the wider concerns have their place too.  These might still sway the decision-makers.

Still, I find it peculiar that, as the BBC is reporting, a three-man panel is in place to decide.  Bigger names will surely have a proportionate say, but the doubts of one of that panel, the Austrian Chancellor Werner Fayman, put Blair at a disadvantage.

Belatedly and exceptionally, some reasonable articles about Blair from The Economist’s David Rennie;

Blair – a moderate

The politics and the disappointment