Just as the BBC is busy dismembering itself for the gratification of the political class, it produces a series of programmes that are a perfectly poised mix of investigations and polemic. The Great Offices of State is pithy and insightful, intelligent and utterly polite. No one does reminiscence quite so well, and Michael Cockerell is a formidable interviewer.
The three episodes cover the Home Office, the Treasury and the Foreign Office respectively. Each are delightfully idiosyncratic, and the mix of political and mandarin opinion highlights those problems which are unique to each, but there is also a larger story at work – the decline of these great ministries. Although hardly unremarked upon, the scale of the challenge that is presented by the outdatedness of Britain’s civil service is rarely so well exposed.
The Foreign Office – Diplodocus
The Foreign Office’s attitude to ministerial direction is described by one civil servant as “like an oyster regards a grain of grit… an irritant with a slim probability of producing a pearl.” It has perhaps the most mixed record, with triumphs like the negotiation of accession to the EC in 1972 juxtaposed with Suez and the cathartic end of Empire. It is often said that the Foreign Office lost an Empire and never quite found a role, but in truth it’s fate was to be rather swamped by the weight of European business – to the obvious distaste of those mandarins unused to European ways of working.
Perhaps the biggest downgrading of the Foreign Office has happened under the Blair administration, despite Jack Straw’s recent assertions of his potency (if only he had had a professional interest in resigning, he might well have done it in 2003, as implied here and in the Chilcott Inquiry). Blair has been the most internationally-minded Prime Minister since Eden and his personal involvement in Northern Ireland, Europe and American relations, not to mention Iraq directly, has been at the expense of the Foreign Office. Another factor is that the Office is necessarily diplomatic, which means a limited influence in times of war when contrasted with the forces.
The Home Office – Not Fit For Purpose
The Home Office has long been a political graveyard for Ministers because of its ability (in the words of Roy Jenkins) to spring disasters from the blue. The last ten years have shown that amply in the careers of both Jacqui Smith and Charles Clarke (who still resents his departure). Others have been luckier. Jack Straw told Cockerell that when he came into office the asylum backlog stood at over 100,000 incomplete cases. When John Reid became Home Secretary in 2005, the number was close to 500,000.
It was Reid who set in motion the division of the Office into its current remit and the Justice Ministry, which deals with prisons, the courts and probation, while the Home Office returns to something more akin to its original function of protecting public law and order. Still, it is regarded as a bitterly cynical department. Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, remembers a presentation back in 1997; crime would be going up because the economy was growing, which meant more things to steal. What if the economy were to be going down, then, asked Powell. In that case, crime would go up, because there would be more people to steal things!
But the Home Office highlights better than any department just how limited the leverage most Ministers have when it comes to enacting policy. The tools at the disposal of the criminal justice system are far removed from the main offices on Marsham Street. The last Home Secretary to be regarded as setting the tone for his brief, Roy Jenkins, did so almost exclusively through legislation (repealing censorship, the criminalisation of homosexuality and the death penalty – the latter very probably because he wanted to replace the board that charts the progress of each death row inmate with a drinks cabinet). But legislation has only a limited effect on policing, probation, and the administrative nightmare that is immigration processing for example.
The Treasury – Gladstonian Revival
The Treasury is still largely recognisable as the department it was before 1997, with one exception. The decision to grant independence to the Bank of England has meant that control over interest rates has been given up. That means that it is less the Thatcherite department of monetary supply, and more the Gladstonian department of taxation, spending and balanced budgets. As we have seen in Alistair Darling, the Chancellor’s close relationship with the City means that with an element of boldness he can still take on the Prime Minister from a position of authority. The same was true, of course, of Lawson when it came to the ERM, before Thatcher wielded the axe.
The Treasury was also fleshed out by Gordon Brown’s Chancellorship, during which it attempted to play the role of a department for the combating of poverty. Some of that influence has been lost, but the current promotion of tax credits instead of benefits gives it a decided edge over the Work and Pensions brief.
New Labour and the Decline of the Office of State
In several ways New Labour has directly exacerbated the decline felt in these Departments. The first is the haphazard way in which devolution and freedom of information has been handled, depriving mandarins of considerable influence. The second is Prime Ministerial leadership. Blair was a particularly involved Prime Minister in many ways. He would go over the heads of his Ministers to the public, guaranteeing standards, promising targets and focussing on results – David Blunkett remembers his leader promising cuts in immigration without consulting his Home Secretary.
The redoubtable historian of the civil service, Peter Hennessy, substantiates Blair’s influence in his book, The Prime Minister; The Office and Its Holders Since 1945. Blair, he feels, veered dangerously close to both establishing a Prime Minister’s Department on top of the old architecture of Whitehall and of trying to force joined-up government without following the proper route through the Cabinet Office. Indeed, it was only as an audit trail that Cabinet was truly significant – most relationships were bilateral, and largely to the benefit of the Prime Minister. The other factor was that with Brown, Blair had a largely dual-Premiership in which each had spheres of influence.
It is a great shame that Hennessy looks unlikely to update The Prime Ministers beyond the 2001 cut-off. Indeed, there was a rush of good analysis in the early years of the Blair administration, which was never carried through into analysis of the political successes and failures of New Labour.
What seems clear insofar as the three so-called great offices of state are concerned, is that issues like crime, the economy and diplomacy will still be contentious. Indeed, they all look like potential election-winners. Whether New Labour’s reforms will lead to greater efficiency or politicisation of the civil service will see meddling preventing the incubation of policy, the institutional levers Ministers have at their disposal are already under scrutiny. The devolution of public services – Academies and Primary Care Trusts – was a key component of Blair’s last years in office. It may continue after an election, in which case the departments will be further truncated. But it may also depend where the strong Ministers are.