The Ex-Soviet Republics, Twenty Years On

(photo taken from Radio Free Europe – check them out)

For someone of my generation, there are many things that are unimaginable about the fall of the Soviet Union. Even in the context of the Arab Spring, and having traveled to Eastern Europe, the collapse of a monstrous autocracy that imposed its will at the barrel of an artillery gun on well over 300 million peoples was a moment without parallel in human history.

Rebellions of Poland in 1955, Hungary the following year, East Germany the year after that and Czechoslovakia in 1968 imply that the authority of communist regimes across Eastern Europe was thin at all times. Indeed, Norman Davies in his abbreviated history of Poland repeats the commonplace joke that there were not enough communists in Poland to run a factory in 1945, let alone a country. Fifty years after the Berlin Wall was erected and nearly twenty-two after it came down, the Soviet Union is a distant memory for the seven countries who have subsequently joined the European Union. It may not be a pleasant memory, but it is an inspiration when a foreign minister of Poland can, without irony, criticise another state for human rights abuses.

Mr Assad, resign now, or we will see you at the Hague.—
Radek Sikorski (@sikorskiradek) August 18, 2011

In light of this, it is easy to lose sight of the events of 19 August 1991, when Soviet hardliners isolated Mikhail Gorbachev in the Crimea and tanks surrounded the Russian Parliament building in Moscow.

There are two reasons that these events are of importance. Today, Radio Free Europe asks the question; does the Soviet Union still exist? On the face of it, the answer is obviously no. The Kremlin does still employ military force against States in its ‘neighbourhood’, as in Georgia in 2008. However, the circumstances in which it can wield force are dramatically limited to issues that impinge upon its own security. This can be an easily manipulated excuse but it is nonetheless a measure against which Russia can be checked.

And for the other States of the former USSR, the difference is considerable:

“When you think about how much apparent — stability is not even the word — unchangeability or just stagnation there was from 1991 all the way until the early part and the middle part of the last decade, I think at that point colored revolutions came as a pretty significant surprise, certainly a very significant new development,”

“These are obviously still extremely vulnerable, extremely unstable, but at the same time, with great potential.”

Matthew Rojansky, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program

The second question is how, given the apparent enthusiasm for democracy in 1991, did Russia slide back into the authoritarianism of the Putin years? A disastrous default, accompanied by high inflation certainly is often argued to have discredited the Western, capitalist model. However, Russia hasn’t moved away from capitalism, or certainly not toward greater equality.

The answer, posits the Financial Times, is that Russia ‘became too rich’. Gas and oil has undoubtedly become the Kremlin’s most significant political tool, ahead of its military might and ahead of its power to appoint regional Governors. Oligarch have remained rich, so long as they have remained compliant with the wishes of the Kremlin. Putin and Medvedev in turn have claimed stabilisation and modernisation as justifications for their repellent regime, doomed by its imitation to the USSR to corruption of morals as well as of wealth.

Elswhere, Ukraine has perhaps benefited politically from not having a source of wealth so prone to be misappropriated, but it has become totally reliant on Russian gas. Belarus, which appears to be teetering on the edge of a democratic revolution, is also reliant on Russian gas for the major source of its income.

Can anything be done? Poland’s foreign minister, as well as Andrew Wilson of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, argue that a European partnership is essential to prising Ukraine and Russia apart. Whether that, or the European Championships as some have argued, ought to be derailed by the persecution of Ukraine’s main opposition figures is a subject of debate. Edward Lucas, addresses the subject in some detail in The New Cold War, as I have previously written.

Coming back to the original point, Western and Eastern European leaders will do well to remember that Russians are not necessarily the fatalistic and submissive holders of the Soviet legacy that they are often painted as. Of course, it would be unwise to bet against anything other than a Putin or Medvedev victory in the coming election campaign. Germany has increased the level of business, always considerable, that it does with Moscow. President Obama has pressed the ‘reset’ button. Nonetheless, in a considerably more tangled web, each act of rapprochement towards Russia has an impact in Minsk, Kiev and Tbilsi. Fortunately, Warsaw, Budapest and Prague seem to remember those they left behind.

Try also this excellent photo-essay on the events of 1991.

Man on Wire

David Miliband has had a mixed few years, and specifically, a mixed few weeks.  A few weeks ago he made a speech to the Labour conference (the graveyard slot) that most media described as unhinged, and that I heard one Labour member describe as brilliant.  This week he could be lauded as Europe’s saviour, or he could reverse the West’s recently improving but schizophrenic relationship with Russia.

Of all the decisions Gordon Brown has made in his short premiership, two stand out as almost uniquely successful.  Bringing Mandelson back into the Cabinet was one.  Elevating David Miliband to the foreign office was another. 

Miliband was the strongest candidate when Brown faced the prospect of a stalking horse after Blair’s departure.  When Brown’s premiership was on the rocks, it was to Miliband that first plotters, and then James Purnell turned to, as the last great hope.  Miliband betrayed both (persuaded by Mandelson to remain in the Cabinet), and as a result saved the government and condemned himself to be passed over for the Labour leadership.

But Miliband’s inertia within the Labour Party are only a part of the story of his decline.  As significant has been his confinement in the foreign office.  It is a position – perhaps the only one – that does not offer a weapon with which to consolidate support to use against Brown.  Instead, it offers one of the most difficult conundrums in British policy – one that can’t be solved by money, that offers no easy choices and no photo ops; how does Britain deal with Russia?

Miliband is an intellectual, not a conviction politician, which shows itself more in his Russian policy than in anything else.  This week, when Miliband should be making his pitch to be the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs (the best way to restore his credibility in the Labour Party and ride out possible opposition), he has to walk the high-rope that is a diplomatic visit to Moscow.

Going, Miliband was optimistic.  On his Foreign Office blog he wrote,

“We don’t always see eye to eye with Russia, but we share the same global challenges and it is important that we work on them together.  And as we are both permanent members of the UN Security Council and members of the G8 and G20, there is a wide range of questions where, by working together, we really can make a difference.”

The implication is that Britain is giving up the passive resistance that has been the hallmark of Anglo-Russian relations.  Over the past three years, the Litvenenko affair, the British Council controversy and the Georgian war have been unprofitable.  It quickly became clear that Russia would not compromise, and that Europe did not have the unanimity to respond.

In recent weeks, Russian has shown some receptiveness to the American State Department’s re-setting initiative.  In return for the USA withdrawing its missile defence system, Russia made a vague statement on imposing sanctions on Iran.

I can only assume that Miliband’s visit is part of these developments.  However, it has hardly gone to plan.  The Litvenenko affair has been allowed to resurface, putting Miliband in an impossible bind. 

To be contrary, and go against the mood (very current, unsecure, but potentially powerful), or stand up for individual cases and abstract principles?  Either way, the issues are unavoidable.  Extending NATO or the EU to Russia’s borders could raise the chances of war (probably with Ukraine).  Too much emphasis on business means sacrificing the Russian civil society Miliband said he was keen to hear from to the dictates of the Kremlin.

Wittingly or not, Miliband’s visit has raised two uncomfortable debates at a time when they could least be afforded.  On the one hand, Labour faces a choice between a realist (dealing with the Russian government as is) or ethical (actively seeking to influence the internal balance) foreign policy.  Secondly, he raises the question of Europe’s approach.  Are European interests best served by trying to close the door on Russia, or by engaging with her?

The latter is the most immediate concern (the former is age-old, and still unresolved).  The Lisbon Treaty was designed to streamline European decision-making and maximise Europe’s collective influence.  The argument that Miliband seems likely to provoke could yet be good for Europe, but it is more likely to create divisions than to resolve them.  Britain will be seen as an awkward partner, or European countries simply will not be able to agree.

As for Miliband’s EU prospects?  They will not be helped, although Russia is not the most significant issue at stake.  Whether a diplomat can be an intellectual and still be effective is a serious question that was raised by Bill Clinton’s presidency.  Miliband may answer it.

The Sphinx’s Gaze

The New Cold War; How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, by Edward Lucas (2008)

Dead, but not forgotten

A friend of mine once ended an essay thus; ‘China is scary.’  Mr Lucas is an Economist journalist, so slightly more hardened to scary governments, but he is also scared.  There is a difference between China and Russia.  The former’s ascent is based on a projection of responsibility – since its economic domination is theoretically inevitable, the Chinese will do nothing to wreck it.  Russia’s world view, on the other hand, is a direct challenge to Western values, backed by a clan of KGB/FSB officials brought to power in the 2000 coup which has almost entirely reversed The Gorbachev Factor, as described so well by Archie Brown.   

Mr Lucas’ book is timely, and as much so today as when it was published.  Last year Russia went to war with Georgia over two separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which it claims are part of the Russian state by right.  This summer the threatening noises have been directed at Ukraine.  To be accused of feeding Georgian militias is not quite as serious as having territory threatened with annexation or ‘liberation,’ but it could barely be closer.  

Behind the doors of the Kremlin immense power is exerted by an ideology Mr Lucas refers to as ‘Sovereign Democracy.’  Taking its inspiration from the disastrous history of the 1990s, sovereign democracy replaces Marxist-Leninism as the justification for extreme centralisation (sovereignty, in place of democracy effectively) with a selective view of history, patriotism and a corrupt deal with the Orthodox Church.  The historical issue is more important than one might think, since Western countries are often ambivalent, if not self-debasing about their own.  In Russia, only ‘positive’ history is taught in schools.  Stalin is revered.  The Nazi-Soviet pact, regrettable though it might be, says Putin, is the legal basis for Russia’s intimidation and envisaged annexation of the Baltic states.

The Russian position is based on a state monopoly on oil and in particular, gas distribution.  Subsidised fuel, though wasted to an astonishing degree has been responsible for the rise in living standards in Russia itself (the proportion of those in poverty has declined from 1/3 of the population to 1/6).  With the Kremlin’s political position therefore secure, it has begun to exert itself in foreign policy.  Gas (the investment in and export of) is both the incentive for the West to be complicit in Russia’s current political state, and the weapon it most often uses to sanction its opponents – especially the former USSR states.

The threat Russia poses is so persuasive because its leaders are so confident and yet, they have no real reason to be.  After 2020, Gazprom will struggle to supply the Russian market, let alone the West.  Russia’s protests about the American plans to build missile defence systems are ludicrous.  Not only are the missiles reactive to Iran, they couldn’t stop a serious-minded Russian attack if there were ten times the number (10).  Most importantly in the long run, Russia is in demographic decline as a result of its ludicrously high death rate.  And yet, Russia has Europe and America on the back foot.  That is what makes the prospect of a risk-taking Kremlin so worrying.

The only person who comes out of The New Cold War with any nobility is Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor.  Perhaps because of her East German background, she alone has refused to do bilateral deals with Russia.  This responsible approach earns her laurels from Mr Lucas, especially in light of her odious predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder.  Indeed, Germany’s current attitude is all the more laudable because it has so long been grateful for the ease with which reunification was allowed.  Nonetheless, the West has shown enough gratitude, and must now begin to look at Russia for what it really is.  

Mr Lucas rather lets himself down by launching into talk of principles in his conclusion.  However, there is a practical response available.  Mr Lucas concludes that the EU must unite around a common security policy, make common cause with those countries on Russia’s borders who are increasingly threatened by the behemoth.  One of the more controversial suggestions Mr Lucas makes is to abandon the UN as a forum for dealing with Russia because the veto system will make stalling inevitable and protracted.  Then again, liberal internationalism is a two-way deal and Russia is dangerously obsessed with doing business on its own terms.

Change within Russia, signs of which were once eagerly sought at the beginning of this recession, looks unlikely.  Putin’s government, fronted by Dmitri Medvedev is popular and increasingly bold.  Pretences are being dropped – the war with Georgia, but also Russia’s discontinuation of the WTO talks being two good indicators. Russia is unpredictable, the more so from a viewpoint as rational as Mr Lucas’.  The business of Russia is still business, but the stability of the nation (and therefore the security of Putin’s party) is also a prime determinant of policy.  Essentially, unless Europe can bring down an iron curtain of sorts, further East than the last, of course, we are at the mercy of the siloviki.  Now, that is scary.

War is still much revered

This excerpt was quoted in Mr Lucas’ book, and backs up his conclusions pretty well.

Russia is a Spinx.  Rejoicing, grieving,

And drenched in black blood,

It gazes, gazes, gazes at you,

With hatred and with love!

Aleksandr Blok, The Scythians