Russia, Putin & the Georgian War

Norma Percy’s documentary on the rule of Vladimir Putin gains in stature each week. Of course, it has not been without its critics, who dismiss it as pro-Putin propaganda and have sent the programme’s consultant, Angus Roxburgh, into a spin. Most of these criticisms have related to the narrator’s allegedly prejudiced tone, his use of the word separatists when he apparently should use ‘freedom fighter’ and the absence of some of the more widespread conspiracy theories, such as Edward Lucas’ well-plotted account of how a series of suspicious apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999 prefigured a coup of sorts.

However valid these critiques are on their own account, they obscure one very important bonus, namely the breadth of sources used and interviews given. To have Condoleezza Rice, so recently US Secretary of State, and Sergei Lavrov, still the Russian foreign minister, discussing open sores in public can only benefit the historian or journalist. Moreover, there is certainly enough scope for viewers to pass judgement against the Russian side to the story, such as the accounts given by Rice and Lavrov of the infamous telephone conversation in which Russia effectively demanded that Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvilli step down as a precondition of peace talks.

War

The programme does not deal a decisive blow to either the Georgian or Russian account of what is known as the 2008 South-Ossetian War, but neither does it pretend to umpire. Given the twin benefits of disinterestedness and hindsight, the War begins to look, like many other wars, as a foolish endeavour. Russia, with its unfortunate habit of getting itself involved in skirmishes on behalf of what it sees as persecuted minorities, only to be painted as the aggressor and be humiliated by the ceasefire (The Crimean War and 1914 come to mind), looks to have come off no better here. Georgia, whose desperation to join NATO was part of the provocation for Russia’s involvement, set back its chances of joining any Western Alliance by some years. America found itself conflicted and wrong-footed, whereas the EU chalked up a first major success in peacekeeping terms by broking the ceasefire and commissioning a report into the causes and conduct of the War.

Putin, Russia & The West undoubtedly leaves some questions open, and here are two important ones:

1. To what extent was the War the result of short-term factors, or the actual events on the ground in South Ossetia, and
2. Does this shed any light on our attitudes to nationalist separatism in the 21st Century?

Causes

At the turn of the millennium it became apparent that the unresolved political status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia had become more difficult to manage and that there was no clear-cut solution in sight. At the same time, geopolitical changes became manifest, among them NATO ́s eastward enlargement and a new international interest in the Caucasus region, linked to extended security considerations and energy supplies.

EU Report into the South-Ossetian War

Percy spends a perhaps slightly unhealthy amount of time on the summitry and general deal-making which is central to Great Power relations. Given the charisma of Secretary Rice and the twists and turns of American policy, this is understandable from a programming point of view, yet any case against the Americans on the bases of inconsistency or weakness towards Russia or indeed Georgia is summarily dismissed by Rice.

Ultimately, missile-defence shields or MAP must have played a limited role in Russia’s decision-making, for the former was irrelevant to Georgia and the latter ought to have persuaded Russia that it was on the brink of taking on the whole of NATO under Article 5. Control of oil pipelines may have played a slightly more significant role, which is hinted at in the EU report into the crisis, yet the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was already unsustainable in 2008 and escalated very quickly.

We may never know how far Russia would have been content to continue supplying separatists with armour (a peculiar understanding of the peacekeeping role mandated to them) and kept their distance, had Georgian troop not begun shelling separatist positions. The EU Report is quite damning of the Georgians, calling their initiative illegal and disproportionate; Russia also comes in for criticism, for threatening to push on to Tbilisi, but her limited right to defend South Ossetia is relatively hard to obscure.

Had George W Bush not called Georgia a ‘beacon of freedom’ in 2005, hubris might not have got the better of Saakashvili as it undoubtedly did. Most significantly, however, this was a conflict zone that the UN saw fit to forget and at no point was it considered a big enough issue to raise until Nicholas Sarkozy bravely took it upon himself to broker a ceasefire after five miserable days.

Separatism

As a power with traditionally strong links to the region and understandably enough, important political, economic and security interests there, Russia was given the role of facilitator in the Georgian-Abkhaz and the Georgian-Ossetian negotiation processes, and that of a provider of peacekeeping forces. This formula, while seemingly in line with the rules of Realpolitik, seriously affected the existing political equilibrium in the region. It meant in practice that these two conflicts could be settled not alone, when the sole interests of the Georgians, the Abkhaz and the Ossetians were duly reconciled, but that the interests of Russia had to be satisfied as well.

EU Report

Were there no provision in the Constitution of the Russian Federation mandating her leaders to protect ethnic Russians overseas, such a policy would remain popular and would most likely still be pursued. The diaspora of Russians over the lands formerly under control of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union make this element of Russian foreign policy unavoidable, however one constitutional anomaly present in both the Russian and Georgian basic laws render diplomacy as effective as a blunt, rusty knife.

To deny dual citizenship, as both these countries (and others) do, is to deny a portion of each population representation. In another area, it has cost Russia some of her best talent, but in Georgia it elevated the fate of ethnic Russian Georgians from an ambassadorial matter to a foreign policy one.

Another mistake, quite forgivable at the time, was to grant to Russia the responsibility for peace-keeping in her ‘Near-Abroad’, thus formalising the sphere of interest which the EU Report sets out to crucify. Of course, Britain and the US have both intervened in areas geographically and historically close to themselves, yet the distinction between the Falklands or Grenada and the breakaway regions of Georgia is that neither Western power outwardly pledged to uphold the status quo while (not so) secretly attempting to unsettle it. This may have made sense while Russia was dealing with the old Soviet hand, Eduard Shevardnadze, but it became untenable under an independently-minded Georgian regime. The EU, which scored a first and last notable success with the ceasefire, has proved to be a relatively level-headed mediator in this role.

Was the West hypocritical about the Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? No more so than Russia herself, which is trying to prevent the exact same consequence in Chechnya, to take one example. The Russian Empire and the Concerts of Great Powers have long since passed, yet the similarities between 2008 and 1856 do often bear out. It is this sense of pathos and waste, rather than intrigue, which Percy would do well to draw out.

The Ex-Soviet Republics, Twenty Years On

(photo taken from Radio Free Europe – check them out)

For someone of my generation, there are many things that are unimaginable about the fall of the Soviet Union. Even in the context of the Arab Spring, and having traveled to Eastern Europe, the collapse of a monstrous autocracy that imposed its will at the barrel of an artillery gun on well over 300 million peoples was a moment without parallel in human history.

Rebellions of Poland in 1955, Hungary the following year, East Germany the year after that and Czechoslovakia in 1968 imply that the authority of communist regimes across Eastern Europe was thin at all times. Indeed, Norman Davies in his abbreviated history of Poland repeats the commonplace joke that there were not enough communists in Poland to run a factory in 1945, let alone a country. Fifty years after the Berlin Wall was erected and nearly twenty-two after it came down, the Soviet Union is a distant memory for the seven countries who have subsequently joined the European Union. It may not be a pleasant memory, but it is an inspiration when a foreign minister of Poland can, without irony, criticise another state for human rights abuses.

Mr Assad, resign now, or we will see you at the Hague.—
Radek Sikorski (@sikorskiradek) August 18, 2011

In light of this, it is easy to lose sight of the events of 19 August 1991, when Soviet hardliners isolated Mikhail Gorbachev in the Crimea and tanks surrounded the Russian Parliament building in Moscow.

There are two reasons that these events are of importance. Today, Radio Free Europe asks the question; does the Soviet Union still exist? On the face of it, the answer is obviously no. The Kremlin does still employ military force against States in its ‘neighbourhood’, as in Georgia in 2008. However, the circumstances in which it can wield force are dramatically limited to issues that impinge upon its own security. This can be an easily manipulated excuse but it is nonetheless a measure against which Russia can be checked.

And for the other States of the former USSR, the difference is considerable:

“When you think about how much apparent — stability is not even the word — unchangeability or just stagnation there was from 1991 all the way until the early part and the middle part of the last decade, I think at that point colored revolutions came as a pretty significant surprise, certainly a very significant new development,”

“These are obviously still extremely vulnerable, extremely unstable, but at the same time, with great potential.”

Matthew Rojansky, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program

The second question is how, given the apparent enthusiasm for democracy in 1991, did Russia slide back into the authoritarianism of the Putin years? A disastrous default, accompanied by high inflation certainly is often argued to have discredited the Western, capitalist model. However, Russia hasn’t moved away from capitalism, or certainly not toward greater equality.

The answer, posits the Financial Times, is that Russia ‘became too rich’. Gas and oil has undoubtedly become the Kremlin’s most significant political tool, ahead of its military might and ahead of its power to appoint regional Governors. Oligarch have remained rich, so long as they have remained compliant with the wishes of the Kremlin. Putin and Medvedev in turn have claimed stabilisation and modernisation as justifications for their repellent regime, doomed by its imitation to the USSR to corruption of morals as well as of wealth.

Elswhere, Ukraine has perhaps benefited politically from not having a source of wealth so prone to be misappropriated, but it has become totally reliant on Russian gas. Belarus, which appears to be teetering on the edge of a democratic revolution, is also reliant on Russian gas for the major source of its income.

Can anything be done? Poland’s foreign minister, as well as Andrew Wilson of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, argue that a European partnership is essential to prising Ukraine and Russia apart. Whether that, or the European Championships as some have argued, ought to be derailed by the persecution of Ukraine’s main opposition figures is a subject of debate. Edward Lucas, addresses the subject in some detail in The New Cold War, as I have previously written.

Coming back to the original point, Western and Eastern European leaders will do well to remember that Russians are not necessarily the fatalistic and submissive holders of the Soviet legacy that they are often painted as. Of course, it would be unwise to bet against anything other than a Putin or Medvedev victory in the coming election campaign. Germany has increased the level of business, always considerable, that it does with Moscow. President Obama has pressed the ‘reset’ button. Nonetheless, in a considerably more tangled web, each act of rapprochement towards Russia has an impact in Minsk, Kiev and Tbilsi. Fortunately, Warsaw, Budapest and Prague seem to remember those they left behind.

Try also this excellent photo-essay on the events of 1991.

The Sphinx’s Gaze

The New Cold War; How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West, by Edward Lucas (2008)

Dead, but not forgotten

A friend of mine once ended an essay thus; ‘China is scary.’  Mr Lucas is an Economist journalist, so slightly more hardened to scary governments, but he is also scared.  There is a difference between China and Russia.  The former’s ascent is based on a projection of responsibility – since its economic domination is theoretically inevitable, the Chinese will do nothing to wreck it.  Russia’s world view, on the other hand, is a direct challenge to Western values, backed by a clan of KGB/FSB officials brought to power in the 2000 coup which has almost entirely reversed The Gorbachev Factor, as described so well by Archie Brown.   

Mr Lucas’ book is timely, and as much so today as when it was published.  Last year Russia went to war with Georgia over two separatist regions (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which it claims are part of the Russian state by right.  This summer the threatening noises have been directed at Ukraine.  To be accused of feeding Georgian militias is not quite as serious as having territory threatened with annexation or ‘liberation,’ but it could barely be closer.  

Behind the doors of the Kremlin immense power is exerted by an ideology Mr Lucas refers to as ‘Sovereign Democracy.’  Taking its inspiration from the disastrous history of the 1990s, sovereign democracy replaces Marxist-Leninism as the justification for extreme centralisation (sovereignty, in place of democracy effectively) with a selective view of history, patriotism and a corrupt deal with the Orthodox Church.  The historical issue is more important than one might think, since Western countries are often ambivalent, if not self-debasing about their own.  In Russia, only ‘positive’ history is taught in schools.  Stalin is revered.  The Nazi-Soviet pact, regrettable though it might be, says Putin, is the legal basis for Russia’s intimidation and envisaged annexation of the Baltic states.

The Russian position is based on a state monopoly on oil and in particular, gas distribution.  Subsidised fuel, though wasted to an astonishing degree has been responsible for the rise in living standards in Russia itself (the proportion of those in poverty has declined from 1/3 of the population to 1/6).  With the Kremlin’s political position therefore secure, it has begun to exert itself in foreign policy.  Gas (the investment in and export of) is both the incentive for the West to be complicit in Russia’s current political state, and the weapon it most often uses to sanction its opponents – especially the former USSR states.

The threat Russia poses is so persuasive because its leaders are so confident and yet, they have no real reason to be.  After 2020, Gazprom will struggle to supply the Russian market, let alone the West.  Russia’s protests about the American plans to build missile defence systems are ludicrous.  Not only are the missiles reactive to Iran, they couldn’t stop a serious-minded Russian attack if there were ten times the number (10).  Most importantly in the long run, Russia is in demographic decline as a result of its ludicrously high death rate.  And yet, Russia has Europe and America on the back foot.  That is what makes the prospect of a risk-taking Kremlin so worrying.

The only person who comes out of The New Cold War with any nobility is Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor.  Perhaps because of her East German background, she alone has refused to do bilateral deals with Russia.  This responsible approach earns her laurels from Mr Lucas, especially in light of her odious predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder.  Indeed, Germany’s current attitude is all the more laudable because it has so long been grateful for the ease with which reunification was allowed.  Nonetheless, the West has shown enough gratitude, and must now begin to look at Russia for what it really is.  

Mr Lucas rather lets himself down by launching into talk of principles in his conclusion.  However, there is a practical response available.  Mr Lucas concludes that the EU must unite around a common security policy, make common cause with those countries on Russia’s borders who are increasingly threatened by the behemoth.  One of the more controversial suggestions Mr Lucas makes is to abandon the UN as a forum for dealing with Russia because the veto system will make stalling inevitable and protracted.  Then again, liberal internationalism is a two-way deal and Russia is dangerously obsessed with doing business on its own terms.

Change within Russia, signs of which were once eagerly sought at the beginning of this recession, looks unlikely.  Putin’s government, fronted by Dmitri Medvedev is popular and increasingly bold.  Pretences are being dropped – the war with Georgia, but also Russia’s discontinuation of the WTO talks being two good indicators. Russia is unpredictable, the more so from a viewpoint as rational as Mr Lucas’.  The business of Russia is still business, but the stability of the nation (and therefore the security of Putin’s party) is also a prime determinant of policy.  Essentially, unless Europe can bring down an iron curtain of sorts, further East than the last, of course, we are at the mercy of the siloviki.  Now, that is scary.

War is still much revered

This excerpt was quoted in Mr Lucas’ book, and backs up his conclusions pretty well.

Russia is a Spinx.  Rejoicing, grieving,

And drenched in black blood,

It gazes, gazes, gazes at you,

With hatred and with love!

Aleksandr Blok, The Scythians