Klitschko’s Weigh-In

Reading this very interesting article about this autumn’s parliamentary elections in Ukraine (as you do), the predicament of the opposition movement struck me as a game of risk similar to the board game of that name. Of course, the main opposition parties will have little choice but to size each other up and fight their corner like a couple of middleweights. An alliance with the nationalistic Svoboda (Freedom) Party is undesirable, yet arithmetic may determine it as necessary.

In fact, the position of the only real boxer taking part is most interesting. Vitali Klitschko, who leads the aptly and subtly named Strike Party, is polling just over the 5% required to obtain a share of the seats in the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament). However, many do not quite believe the precipitate decline in the governing Party of Regions’ share (currently a third of its 2010 peak) and the approach of the elections may consolidate support behind the larger parties, depriving Strike of a share in the seats.

Consider This

Your candidate is a charismatic, popular national figure with a bit of money (but not as much as the other, oligarch-backed parties). Multipolar politics means that while you have run as an independent against the government, you are not necessarily of the opposition. You have to decide how to play the other parties in the run up to the elections – complete independence is an option, but the introduction of new/old rules allowing parties to decide on closed lists for the elections means that you have more to gain from cooperation.

Assumption one – you are not going to get over the 5% threshold. This is easy – you identify the prevailing mood in the country and stick so closely to the representative party that you may even merge at some point. At least, they put you on their list.

Assumption two – you get over the 5%, however, the opposition do not constitute the majority in parliament. Do you sell out to the governing party, believing that an entrenched majority could keep them in power for the next decade, or do you plough your own furrow outside of the major political blocks. This risks irrelevance, although the third option, a vigorous attempt to lead the opposition parties through policy choices (dragging them either left or centre) also entails risks.

Assumption three – you get over the 5% and the opposition do constitute a majority (albeit with Svoboda as part of the majority). Strike will be attractive in this scenario – both mathematically and politically. The major parties will try to manipulate Klitschko into fronting their own vehicles, but concessions are also a possibility. In this scenario you can either:

a) Cleave to one or other of the major opposition parties, adopting most of their policies and accepting a relatively fixed quota of seats; or

b) Seek to exacerbate divisions between the two major opposition blocs, establish yourself as a national personality and ultimately get both to support you as a Presidential Candidate in two or three years time.

Quotes in the article referred to above suggest that Klitschko may be more inclined towards the latter, yet the really interesting feature of Ukrainian politics is that this sort of horse trading takes place before the elections, forcing the opposition to show its hand. Neither scenario is perfect, given that the opposition has not imposed itself as a force on Viktor Yanukovych’s administration. Sviatoslav Khomenko, however, appears to believe that Yanukovych may be worried enough to try dirty tricks. With the eyes of the world on Ukraine during the Euro 2012 Championships and with the EU Association Agreement in limbo, that would be a form of social suicide, yet it is far from impossible.

Coda

Klitschko’s record in the most compelling saga in Ukrainian politics is worth an in-depth look, which I do not intend to do, having bored you, dear reader, for too long. Following the arrest of former Prime Minster and Presidential Candidate Yulia Tymoshenko, Klitschko has been vocal in calling for her release. Yet, while the major opposition parties have coordinated but not combined using an association called the Dictatorship Resistance Committee, Klitschko has so far refused to sign his party up.

Could it be that Klitschko is gambling on there being a political resonance to the Tymoshenko case wider than the political battle between her party and Yanukovych’s and is unwilling to estrange the latter? His pro-European stance fits in well with the opposition, and yet he has kept his distance. Only time will tell what the fight will ultimately look like.

Dealing with Putin

The results of the Russian Presidential Election had barely begun when a victory party in honour of Vladimir Putin began in Moscow. Those who had predicted that the margin would be relatively comfortable – around 59% on current results – were proved correct. Omens were seen in the reshuffling of Vladislav Surkov out of the Kremlin; Surkov, it was believed, had argued that Putin needed to limit the extent of his support to something like 53% to be seen as credible amongst those wavering on whether to join the protest movement.

Accusations of vote-rigging have already been levelled. In some areas, such as Dagestan or Chechneya, which will grant Putin Saddam Hussein-like levels of support, evidence is hardly needed. The West will feel the need to query the results, but in the absence of internal pressure on the Kremlin (i.e. one of the major candidates calling for a re-run, supported by large public demonstrations), that will blow over.

Nonetheless, the West will have to make some big calls over the next couple of years, which will undoubtedly impact on its relationship with Putin. Here are some of them:

1. Does the US proceed to repeal the Jackson Vanik agreement? The arguments against repeal and for a specific exemption are well made here, yet it is hard to see how the amendment can apply to today’s Russia, or to two countries in the World Trade Organisation.
2. How does the WTO relationship pan out? Russia’s accession to the WTO theoretically makes it more difficult for Russia to adopt preferential trade agreements with favourite partners, or to block imports from neighbours like Ukraine or Georgia, but the Kremlin will undoubtedly lean on the US and EU to prevent this.
3. Does the EU push through the liberalisation of the European gas trade? This article highlights the problems that Gazprom’s fixed term contracts are causing EU members. Might this be a moment when the EU finds a common position on Russia?
4. The autumn of 2012 is likely to see Britain open an inquest into the death of Alexander Litvinenko, opening a barely healed sore. The Kremlin refuses to extradite the suspects, so how far does Britain go? Sanctions are plausible, but are likely to be restricted to travel visas for certain officials to begin with. If that doesn’t solve anything (and it probably won’t), where do you go from there?
5. Does the EU press ahead with a or the US expand its Magnitsky List of sanctions?
6. Do the EU and/or US ratchet up the pressure on Russia over Iran and Syria? Russia is unlikely to want to ditch its allies, while the West is becoming increasingly anxious in both cases. Will Vladimir Putin take diplomatic urgency as an affront or an expample of Western ‘colonialism’ as he has recently accused Britain of pursuing?
7. Does the EU start to bring sanctions on Ukraine if the 2012 elections are described as undemocratic? Putin has not treated Viktor Yanukovych as an important strategic ally, but neither will he want to see the West weakening a country that many in Russia see as essentially Russian and/or a bulwark against the advance of NATO and the EU.
8. How does the US manage the Reset? The geopolitical pressures that existed in George W. Bush’s time no longer exist, while both Russia and the US appear to have benefitted from the Reset between Obama and Medvedev. The Reset could easily survive, if limited to arms control, but as a principle, bilateralism is difficult with Putin. Wilfully threatening at his worst and dependent on anti-Americanism to sustain his electoral machine, the advantages that Medvedev sought from Washington will not benefit Putin, who will instead have to face the goading of John McCain and potentially a Republican Senate.

Nightmare in Minsk

Everyone with a conscience about affairs in Europe should watch this moving, occasionally light-hearted, and very brave documentary about contemporary Belarus. Stuck ‘in a Soviet reservation’ as the narrator puts it, Belarusians have endured a lot over the past eighteen months and are hardly helped by their immediate neighbours. Hat-tip to New Eastern Europe for the link.

The Lukashenka government restricts freedom of assembly for critical independent groups. Protests and rallies require authorization from local authorities, who can arbitrarily withhold or revoke permission. When public demonstrations do occur, police frequently break them up and arrest participants. Freedom of association is severely restricted, with more than a hundred of the most active nongovernmental organizations forced to close down between 2003 and 2005.

Although the country’s constitution calls for judicial independence, courts are subject to significant executive influence. The right to a fair trial is often not respected in cases with political overtones. An internal passport system, in which a passport is required for domestic travel and to secure permanent housing, limits freedom of movement and choice of residence.

Freedom House, The Worst of the Worst, 2011

Human rights organisations often have a decidedly grey manner of portraying unpleasant regimes. Executive summaries, like the one above (which puts Belarus amongst the fifteen worst States in the world for human rights abuses), hide a multitude of crimes; beatings, thefts, murders. This unfortunate, if necessary, exactness of language is bearable when there are people prepared to go the extra mile to sway the more disinterested amongst us. Director, Ekaterina Kibalchich, whose Belarusian Dream has won awards for its portrayal of a year in the life of an ordinary resident of Minsk, is such a person.

Consider an environment in which the Head of State, who is also the Head of Government, is a delusional, if occasionally amusing caricature. Not content with being the best ice hockey player in the country, he wishes to absorb a neighbouring state, fifteen times the size of his (in population terms). His young son, being groomed as a successor, follows him everywhere – whether to the State bank to ogle gold bars, to a farm to inspect potatoes, or scenes of gratuitous violence. All he asks of his people, who be benevolently looks down on, is absolute loyalty.

In 2010 the political mood of the country grows more restless as the impact of the global recession is felt. The populations longs for access to the EU, for education, travel and jobs, not just the clean streets of Minsk and prepares to put up alternative candidates for Presidential elections in December. Those elections fall decidedly and suspiciously in favour of the President, with no other candidate gaining more than 3% of the vote. Any person who dares protest against the result is spirited away for Christmas and New Year. The runner up in the poll is sentenced to five years incarceration.

Things get nastier. There is the suspicious death of Charter 97 Journalist Aleh Byabenin, the pitiful announcement from another opposition leader that he backs the stolen election and Lukashenka entirely. Events culminate in the summer with a terrorist attack on the Minsk Metro, which killed seven. Suddenly, the struggle for democracy looks less and less like a Velvet Revolution.

What is remarkable is the grace with which the Belarusian protestors took this frightening development. Like the key waving on the Czechoslovakian marches in Prague back in 1989, protestors turn up and clap or wave flags so that they cannot be accused of committing any crime. This does not entirely prevent the authorities from indulging in their usual methods, but succeeds visually and most importantly, morally. Yet in this exhilarating whirl, bankruptcy catches up with Belarus, a 56% devaluation of the currency and the emptying of the shops follows. Lukashenka is living on borrowed time, but so are the protestors.

Now it is the turn of external actors to catalyse the situation. Belarus has so far been able to rely on Russia to stave of desperation, so long as it engages in a quid pro quo and doesn’t try any funny business or indulge in a colour revolution to match those of Georgia, Ukraine or Kazakstan. The amount Russia has been prepared to lend to or invest in Belarus over the next two years is astonishing, given the current instability in the Country:

• Purchase of Beltransgaz – $2.5 billion
• Rollover of $100 million in payment arrears
• 40 per cent reduction in the gas price to Belarus to $165 until 2014, (saving Minsk $2 billion)
• $10 billion loan for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Astravets
• A Sberbank loan of $1 billion to the potash company Belaruskali (in return for shares in other target companies)
• An agreement to free up the second $440 million tranche of the loan from the Eurasian Economic Union agreed last summer.

Source: Lucky Lukashenko, by Andrew Wilson

The European Union has been slow to act. Like much of the Eastern Partnership, introspection has made Europe’s diplomats less confident looking outwards, while economic interests in Belarua have led to the less than creditworthy veto of sanctions on Belarusian businessmen, allowing a Sovenian company to secure the contract for a generous hotel that is to be built. Diplomats have been expelled on both sides, and Poland’s foreign minister has dropped any pretence of diplomacy.

Hope guests @the Kempinski, Minsk, will spare a thought for the Belorus political prisoners, who rot in jail so that they are comfortable.—
Radek Sikorski (@sikorskiradek) February 27, 2012

This is an emotive issue, and rightly so. But it is also a strategic one. Belarus is increasingly important for transporting gas from Russia to Germany via the Nord Stream, and it is for this reason that Russia has bought into the gas transit system and proposed a customs union. Therefore both the EU and Russia have invested in Belarus’ future, but not that of its people. With Vladimir Putin almost certainly returning to the Russian Presidency and the US government pushing for repeal of the Jackson-Vanick restrictions on trade, Russia’s realpolitik in Syria and its near abroad is very likely to continue. Eastern Europe, both Belarus and Ukraine, continues to suffer.

Reports from the Warsaw Summit

The immediate aftermath of the second Eastern Partnership summit brought several different conclusions. The joint statement itself was a bland and uninspiring read. In true EU style, it read as though it was deliberately drafted so that you couldn’t get a story out of it if you rearranged all of the words in a completely different order. The view of the Swedish foreign minister, one of the most hawkish participants when it comes to human rights and the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) sounded similarly unconvincing;

Overall, the assessment the day after is that the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw was a success. Reinforced our commitment to region.—
Carl Bildt (@carlbildt) October 01, 2011

Others, less compromised, were also less inhibited. EurActive, a news website, described the summit as a diplomatic fiasco, inspired partly by the Polish opposition Law and Justice Party’s attacks on its government, currently conducting the EU Presidency.

The fiasco was two-fold. Firstly, no major announcement was made that could revitalise process that looks increasingly stalled in the wake of criticism of the Ukrainian government’s attitude to human rights and the rule of law. Secondly, an attempt to turn the boycott of the Belarussian government over criticism of their own human rights abuses to the organisers advantage failed to grab the imagination of the five countries that did turn up to negotiate enhanced relationships with the EU.

Few had very high hopes for the summit. Angela Merkel was one of two heads of government in attendance (including Donald Tusk of Poland who had little choice – in 2009, Merkel was the only premier to turn up and Germany undoes much of its good work in this regard by its close relations and bilateral energy dealings with Russia). However, Nick Clegg announced himself with a strongly-worded speech and this was to be a priority for the ambitious Polish EU Presidency.

Several problems with the ENP present themselves. The first is that the countries applying for what they ultimately hope will be an accession process are constrained by forces Europe hardly feels. Ukraine’s trial of Yulia Tymoshenko, which so exercises Western politicians (rightly) cannot be dropped while the Ukrainian government seek to renegotiate with Russia the basis of the gas deal for which she is being prosecuted. Many have similar experiences of corruption, subsidies that need to be reformed and uncomfortable domestic politics that are not as soluble as the EU would like to think.

The ENP is probably also underfunded; although the summit announced that the European Partnership would have a budget of €1.9bn, the €22m contribution towards building civil society and democratic movements has to be spread six ways. There is no politician in Europe today of sufficient clout or great internal need to subvert due process as has been done in so many cases in the past (Britain’s rebate, German Reunification, the Euro and the Schengen Treaty all spring to mind). Nonetheless, the importance of a westerly partner of strength and access to markets matters to the borderlands between Europe and Russia.

The major problem with the ENP is that it seeks to advance on a confessional basis. The Accession of 2004 followed economic ‘shock therapy’ and Serbia has moved rapidly along the road since the arrest of Ratklo Mladic earlier this year.

The Warsaw Summit attempted to make Belarus the sacrificial lamb by attempting to coerce the five attending parties to sign a declaration ostracising the Lukashenko regime. Admirable as this hard approach to Europe’s last dictator is, the governments of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia objected on the basis that this was somewhat irrelevant to the task at hand and amounted to bullying. On the former count, they had a point, though there is no doubt that they would have helped their cause by putting aside any concerns on the latter.

Calls in the wake of the summit for a more bilateral process (as opposed to trying to fit six very differently shaped countries into an inflexible process) have some merit – but they also fail to acknowledge that these negotiations are labour intensive at a time when the EU has to agree a new budget, an entirely new mechanism for dealing with sovereign debt crises and the potential admission of eight new members at a time of enlargement fatigue.

Those who say that baby steps toward visa liberalisation will advance the Eastern Partnership are not entirely wrong, but they are misguided if they think that these countries are ripe to be harvested. EU enlargement is entering its most difficult phase and much will depend on direction that Russia takes when Putin returns to office. This part of the world is not recovering from the financial crisis in a steady fashion and human rights are imperilled. That is why Poland has staked so much on these negotiations when it usually takes a hard line on human rights in the East.

Much like the response to the Eurozone crisis, the Warsaw Summit is not exactly a step backwards. On the other hand, the EU does not appear to be keeping pace. With Tymoshenko expected to be given a sentence of seven years next week, it is difficult to see the momentum continuing.

Political Repression in Central and Eastern Europe

Dear Mr Cryer MP

Political Repression in Central and Eastern Europe

I am writing to you to raise my concerns about the current Human Rights situation in Belarus and Ukraine.

After the disputed elections in December 2010 the citizens of Belarus have been subjected to many violations of their human rights and civil liberties. The regime of Alexsander Lukashenko is holding presidential candidates, their staff and supporters in detention as well as prominent journalists and human rights activists. The justice system in Belarus is heavily influenced by the regime and the political prisoners have been denied access to proper legal counsel. Exiled presidential candidate Aliaksei Mikhalevich has spoken of torture and inhumane treatment whilst in custody.

I also note that since the election of Victor Yanukovych as President in 2010, Ukraine has experienced deterioration in political and press freedoms. The trial of leading members of the previous government has been described as politically motivated by governments in the EU and by US officials and Freedom House currently describes the country as only partly free.

Countries in Central Europe will no doubt be experiencing the sharp end of the global recession and the Russian Government’s plans for a customs union to shield these countries from global trends will no doubt prove attractive in the short term. However, I am concerned by the Russian Government’s predilection for restricting political and economic freedoms at home and abroad. The Russian Government’s dealings with Ukraine since the ‘Gas Wars’ of 2005 and 2008 has plainly shown their desire to use economic blackmail to achieve their political aims.

I also note that Poland, as President of the European Union for the period to 31 December 2011, has made a Free Trade Agreement with Ukraine a priority. While politicians rightly look on event in the Arab world with pride, I believe that more needs to be done to secure the gains made in Central and Eastern Europe since the breakup of the Soviet Union twenty years ago.

I urge you to lobby for a discussion in Parliament about the situation in Belarus and Ukraine and the possible action the UK could take to ensure the people of these States are afforded their human rights. It seems to me that the Prime Minister could, in the spirit of one of his ‘big, open and comprehensive’ offers along with other leaders of EU States, bring attention to this awful situation

Thank you for your time and attention.

Yours sincerely

Josh Black

A Fresh Crisis

Since 2009, and even before, Ukraine has been convulsed by the question of how much it should pay for its gas imports. The vast majority of these imports come from Russia, the largest regional power and an increasingly assertive player in its near abroad.

In early 2009, the government of Yulia Tymoshenko was effectively forced into an agreement, whereby the price of gas was hiked upwards (albeit, still below market value), when gas imports where cut off in the preceding winter. The EU, concerned for it’s own supplies, welcomed the agreement but the domestic political effect was that Tymoshenko was defeated in the 2010 Presidential Election.

Victor Yanukovych came to power pledging to mend relations with Russia and revisit the gas import agreement, while continuing to negotiate towards a favourable relationship with the EU. This culminated in last year’s Kharkiv, in which Ukraine secured a thirty per cent discount in return for extending the lease on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and a host of conditions, including a take or buy clause attempts minimum monthly payment. Now, the government is forced to seek a further discount as they attempt to cut consumption by twenty per cent.

Mr Yanukovych’s attempts to negotiate with Russia have so far been like snake handling. His crass attempt to prove that the Tymoshenko deal is invalid through a public trial of the former PM have offended both Russia and the EU, while exposing his administration to charges of authoritarianism. Now the EU is threatening a hiatus in talks on a Partnership Agreement and Russia has today begun pumping oil through the Baltics, circumventing Ukraine. The pressure is on.

Ukraine cannot join both Unions, as much because Dmitry Medvedev’s has ruled it out as because they are mutally contradictory. Thus it is hypocritical, to say the least, that Russia’s foreign minister should talk of Russia being cornered. Mr Yanukovych has attempted to keep alive the possibility of a joining the Russian bloc, although the premise is clearly not attractive.

http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/78547/

The window for compromise appears small. Mr Yanukovych has signalled that he is willing to offer Russia valuable investments in Ukraine’s infrastructure, which will hopefully ensure their interest in Ukraine’s continued stability and growth, but not a stake in the state gas company, Naftogaz. Naftogaz will instead be reformed to comply with international expectations, although the government’s form in this area is not inspiring.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/06/us-ukraine-russia-gas-idUSTRE78502R20110906

In 2010, the entire board of Naftogwander replaced and the corporate intermediary between the Russian and Ukrainian state gas companies, RUE, which Ms Tymoshenko had cut out of the chain, was granted compensation for its loss at an international arbitration court after Naftogaz withdrew its legal arguments.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,736745-3,00.html

Given the increasing beligerence of the Russian government, it would be ironic but not entirely imporbable if the dispute returned to the Stockhold arbitration court in which RUE won their victory.

The prospects for Mr Yanukovych’s attempts to gain a favourable deal do not look very great. Joining the Russian Union would entail a loss of sovereignty and a potentially disastrous lack of access to Western markets, a backward economic step. It could also make Ukraine dependent on Russian credit if the IMF withdraws from the country, putting a Russian government not averse to mixing strategic priorities very much in charge.

And yet, the Western option also presents problems for the Ukranian economy. It would not solve the gas problem and neoliberal reforms are not considered ‘shock therapy’ for no reason in the former Soviet Union for nothing.

To take the country decisively in either direction would require a big gamble and a lot of political capital. Unfortunately, the trial of members of the opposition renders that political capital as hard power, of the kind that rapidly suffocates soft power.

Sentencing is expected shortly in the trial of Ms Tymoshenko. Having wasted so much effort on ensuring that the opposition was rendered toothless so his own supporters could profit, Mr Yanukovych is now on a hiding to nothing.

The EU Changes Tack on its Eastern Partners

I have written previously on the relatively subdued response to the arrest of Ukraine’s opposition leaders and the implications of this for Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych. In doing so, I may well have given the impression that European leaders were being soft, when the reality is that Poland, the current holders of the EU Presidency, were intent on using soft power to remedy the ills of Ukraine’s clannish politics.

Appeasement need not be the word to describe that policy, although the likelihood is that it was on many a tongue in more realist circles. The pressure on Ukraine, and indeed on Belarus from Moscow to join Dmitry Medvedev’s customs unions has political and economic clout, while expansion fatigue following the tortuous process of adopting an EU Constitution and the Eurozone crises have all but ruled out the possibility of full membership of the EU for Ukraine. Poland’s foreign ministry appeared to have decided that at a potential turning point in Ukraine’s history, they cannot afford to be encouraging the pro-Russian tendency in the Party of Regions.

At this weekend’s summit in Sopot, Poland (near Gdansk and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad), the opposite position appears to have gained the upper hand. Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, has been an enthusiastic proponent of the EU using what diplomatic might it can muster to persuade the Ukrainian government to release Yulia Tymoshenko, amongst others and indeed, it is he who is quoted, along with France’s Alain Juppe, as degrading Ukraine’s hopes even of a Partnership Agreement.

Good that our stern remarks on Ukraine in Sopot yesterday have been widely noted. on.ft.com/oAaKSv—
Carl Bildt (@carlbildt) September 04, 2011

Writing in the Washington Post this week, Ms Tymoshenko warned of the implications of the Yanukovych government’s policies for Ukraine. EU accession, never viewed as enthusiastically by the majority in Ukraine as in Central Europe on account of the large Russian minority population, will probably not see this weekend’s sanction as a reason to evict Mr Yanukovych.

Nonetheless, there is a residual fear amongst Ukrainians of being considered a failed nation. Many disappointing years have passed since Ukraine’s increasing distance from Western European markets and endemic corruption prompted sustained street protests. Mr Yanukovcyh is dependent on good relations with the outside world at least as far as the IMF is concerned, and perhaps also including trade and investment. To that extent, his expressions of confidence in the process of negotiating with the EU may be bluster.

N.B. This article, written a few days ago, gives a flavour of the very different expectations of some politicians; http://euobserver.com/895/32305

The Ex-Soviet Republics, Twenty Years On

(photo taken from Radio Free Europe – check them out)

For someone of my generation, there are many things that are unimaginable about the fall of the Soviet Union. Even in the context of the Arab Spring, and having traveled to Eastern Europe, the collapse of a monstrous autocracy that imposed its will at the barrel of an artillery gun on well over 300 million peoples was a moment without parallel in human history.

Rebellions of Poland in 1955, Hungary the following year, East Germany the year after that and Czechoslovakia in 1968 imply that the authority of communist regimes across Eastern Europe was thin at all times. Indeed, Norman Davies in his abbreviated history of Poland repeats the commonplace joke that there were not enough communists in Poland to run a factory in 1945, let alone a country. Fifty years after the Berlin Wall was erected and nearly twenty-two after it came down, the Soviet Union is a distant memory for the seven countries who have subsequently joined the European Union. It may not be a pleasant memory, but it is an inspiration when a foreign minister of Poland can, without irony, criticise another state for human rights abuses.

Mr Assad, resign now, or we will see you at the Hague.—
Radek Sikorski (@sikorskiradek) August 18, 2011

In light of this, it is easy to lose sight of the events of 19 August 1991, when Soviet hardliners isolated Mikhail Gorbachev in the Crimea and tanks surrounded the Russian Parliament building in Moscow.

There are two reasons that these events are of importance. Today, Radio Free Europe asks the question; does the Soviet Union still exist? On the face of it, the answer is obviously no. The Kremlin does still employ military force against States in its ‘neighbourhood’, as in Georgia in 2008. However, the circumstances in which it can wield force are dramatically limited to issues that impinge upon its own security. This can be an easily manipulated excuse but it is nonetheless a measure against which Russia can be checked.

And for the other States of the former USSR, the difference is considerable:

“When you think about how much apparent — stability is not even the word — unchangeability or just stagnation there was from 1991 all the way until the early part and the middle part of the last decade, I think at that point colored revolutions came as a pretty significant surprise, certainly a very significant new development,”

“These are obviously still extremely vulnerable, extremely unstable, but at the same time, with great potential.”

Matthew Rojansky, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russia and Eurasia Program

The second question is how, given the apparent enthusiasm for democracy in 1991, did Russia slide back into the authoritarianism of the Putin years? A disastrous default, accompanied by high inflation certainly is often argued to have discredited the Western, capitalist model. However, Russia hasn’t moved away from capitalism, or certainly not toward greater equality.

The answer, posits the Financial Times, is that Russia ‘became too rich’. Gas and oil has undoubtedly become the Kremlin’s most significant political tool, ahead of its military might and ahead of its power to appoint regional Governors. Oligarch have remained rich, so long as they have remained compliant with the wishes of the Kremlin. Putin and Medvedev in turn have claimed stabilisation and modernisation as justifications for their repellent regime, doomed by its imitation to the USSR to corruption of morals as well as of wealth.

Elswhere, Ukraine has perhaps benefited politically from not having a source of wealth so prone to be misappropriated, but it has become totally reliant on Russian gas. Belarus, which appears to be teetering on the edge of a democratic revolution, is also reliant on Russian gas for the major source of its income.

Can anything be done? Poland’s foreign minister, as well as Andrew Wilson of the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, argue that a European partnership is essential to prising Ukraine and Russia apart. Whether that, or the European Championships as some have argued, ought to be derailed by the persecution of Ukraine’s main opposition figures is a subject of debate. Edward Lucas, addresses the subject in some detail in The New Cold War, as I have previously written.

Coming back to the original point, Western and Eastern European leaders will do well to remember that Russians are not necessarily the fatalistic and submissive holders of the Soviet legacy that they are often painted as. Of course, it would be unwise to bet against anything other than a Putin or Medvedev victory in the coming election campaign. Germany has increased the level of business, always considerable, that it does with Moscow. President Obama has pressed the ‘reset’ button. Nonetheless, in a considerably more tangled web, each act of rapprochement towards Russia has an impact in Minsk, Kiev and Tbilsi. Fortunately, Warsaw, Budapest and Prague seem to remember those they left behind.

Try also this excellent photo-essay on the events of 1991.

Dare Ukraine Face Europe’s Quiet Outrage?

It is more than fortunate that I do not make predictions for a living. Just a week after writing that the case against former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, offered little threat to President Victoy Yanukvych, the news came through that she had been arrested for contempt of court.

The international reaction to the news was all of a kind. The arrest has been universally condemned, including by Russia, as well as the West. Moreover, the arrest threatens to destabilise the delicate balance that foreign governments have been treading between wariness over the trial and the desire not to interfere in the Ukrainian judicial system.

In an excellent editorial for the Moscow Times, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Carl Bildt, argues that the trials (including those of other politicians from the previous government) ‘provide the clearest indication yet that Ukraine, despite assurances by Yanukovych’s government, is developing in the wrong direction.’ Germany has called the trials ‘regrettable‘ and the France has summonded the Ukrainian ambassador to discuss the matter. Crucially, the Visegard Group (founded to champion the European claims of the former communist Eastern Europe after 1991) has also been applying pressure, although it is from America that the boldest accusations of political motivation have come (John McCain has even argued for the government to secure Ms Tymoshenko’s release, as step relatively few public figures have taken).

Unfortunately, the response has not been without some chaos. It was initially reported that France’s outspoken ambassador had been recalled after he called the trial politically motivated (even before the arrest). Few governments have gone as far as newspapers such as the Washington Post, which says that the Ukrainian government is making a choice between its European destiny and its short term security. Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev is meeting with Mr Yanukovych, but it is unclear to what extent the trial will be raised.

More importantly, as I have argued previously, the EU has made a Partnership Agreement with Ukraine such a high priority that it is almost unconditional. Poland, current holder of the EU Presidency, sees the best way forward as locking Ukraine into Europe to exclude Russia. Foreign investment is flooding back into Ukraine and the IMF still backs the government. As such, Mr Yanukvych has little to fear from the West.

Whether he has anything to fear from Ukrainians remains to be seen. There have been street protests in favour of Tymoshenko, with calls for the Foreign Minister to resign. So far these have not reached anything like a critical level, although with winter looming a sudden economic shock could bring the government’s popularity down dramatically. Another advantage is that Ukrainians are still largely jaded from Ms Tymoshenko’s period of government, the tribulations of the Orange Revolution and the economic crisis. However, were a heavyweight poitical figure to emerge with a considerable amount of charisma, Mr Yanukovych might end up facing the barrell of a ballot box.

http://www.dailymotion.com/embed/video/xkepx8?width=320

Ukraine and Yulia on Trial

Last week brought drama that would previously have been though unthinkable to the trial of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine. On Wednesday the judge, Rodion Kireyev, resisted arrest of Ms Tymoshenko. Ms Tymoshenko repaid this apparently chivalric show of judicial independence by calling the judge a governmental stooge and announcing that she will be calling for a replacement this week, having apparently documented his multiple failings on her iPad.

Having laughably raised the possibility of charging Ms Tymoshenko for spending the proceeds of carbon trading on much needed flu vaccines during the 2008/9 winter, the prosecution has settled on charges relating to the gas deals Ms Tymoshenko signed with Vladimir Putin in 2009. That these deals increased the price of gas Ukraine purchased from Russia, while also setting minimum quotas means that the current government of Victor Yanukovych has a useful political point to bludgeon home.

That said, it remains bizarre that Mr Yanukovych would want to put his rival in last February’s poll on trial, confirming, in the words of The Economist, that he is the very thing he has sought to avoid, ‘a neo-Soviet autocrat.’

Since that election, he has struck a new deal with Russia, by no means beyond criticism, but with a 30% discount on imports as the headline figure. This has encouraged the IMF to re-open its credit line, while in a separate but no less important show of confidence, foreign investment is up 35%. The summer has started very promisingly, while this year promises a bumper grain harvest and next year Ukraine is co-hosting Euro 2012 with Poland.

Moreover, the wider political atmosphere is congenial, to say the least. Western governments, if not all diplomats, have largely bought into Mr Yanukovych’s promise that he has not turned his back on European integration. NATO is currently conducting joint exercises with Ukraine, while Poland is making a free trade agreement with its Eastern neighbour a priority of its EU Presidency. Surprisingly, given election propaganda at the time, the international consequences of Mr Yanukovych’s victory have been almost nil.

There has been criticism of Mr Yanukovych, for sure. Freedom House has been critical of his administration and in a compelling analysis of the deal Mr Yanukovych made with the Kremlin, trading lower gas prices for a renewal of the lease on the Sevastopol naval base used by Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, Chatham House’s James Sherr has cited several clauses that disadvantage Ukraine at least as much as Ms Tymoshenko’s two deals.

Firstly, the discount is calculated as a debt, meaning that if in future the lease is terminated, Ukraine will be lumbered with a huge bill by Russia. Secondly, the transit fees will not be allowed to rise in line with market forces, as per the previous deals. Finally, Gazprom has indicated that it is resistant to letting Ukraine off the hook with the take or pay quotas and could oppose re-exporting the gas. Russia, meanwhile, has not let up in its indications that it would like to build a new pipeline to bypass Ukraine altogether, removing a staple of the Ukrainian economy.

Ukraine’s judiciary has proved its independence before, most noticeably when the Supreme Court ruled for a repeat of the corrupt 2004 elections that preceded the Orange Revolution. This raises the possibility that the trial might collapse, Ukraine having proven its relative freedom while depriving Ms Tymoshenko of resources and the ability to challenge Mr Yanukovych’s dealings in the mean time.

In a sense, it is win-win for the government whether Yulia Tymoshenko is found guilty or not, assuming that the EU continues its unchallenging stance. Business confidence hardly seems phased by internal politics and the government is relatively unassailable as the economic situation continues to improve. Yet that very invulnerability doubles up as a reason to drop the trials of several members of the previous government. Some politicians, such as Senator John McCain, are only too keen to press home uncomfortable truths when Mr Yanukovych is in a less comfortable position. Given that Mr Yanukovych won the last election by a whisker, he ought by Western standards to be more careful. But in the former Soviet Union, that does not always appear to be the first instinct and old habit die hard.